A Chronology of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict and Peace Process

A Chronology of the Eritrea-Ethiopia

August 2008

“When is a ‘final and binding’ decision reached by a neutral body of legal experts open to negotiation? The international community is facing this question in the Horn of Africa, where the regional giant Ethiopia has rejected as ‘unacceptable’ a Border Commission ruling on its border with tiny Eritrea. ... [I]f international arbitration were easy for losing parties to swallow, wars would never occur in the first place. ...There is far more at stake here than the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea.”
— Financial Times of London, June 17, 2003.

“The line of the [Eritrea and Ethiopia] boundary was legally and finally determined by its Delimitation Decision of 13 April 2002. Though [physically] undemarcated, this line is binding upon both Parties. … Conduct inconsistent with this boundary line is unlawful.”
— The Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission, February 24, 2005..

“The Commission hereby determines that the boundary will automatically stand as demarcated by the boundary points listed in the Annex hereto and that the mandate of the Commission can then be regarded as fulfilled.”
— The Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission, November 27, 2006.

July 18-24, 1997— Ethiopian troops entered the Badme
and Bada area and begun a unilateral demarcation of the border, massive
expulsion of Eritreans, and setting up its own administration."

August 16 and 25, 1997— Eritrea's President Isaias
Afwerki wrote two letters to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia protesting
Ethiopia’s aggression.

October 17, 1997— The Ethiopian Mapping Authority
issued a map that incorporated a large of Eritrean territory into Ethiopia.

May 6, 1998— Ethiopian troops, unprovoked, fired at an
Eritrean patrol unit on routine duty along the border around Badme killing
several of its members.

May 13, 1998— The Ethiopian Parliament declared war on
Eritrea! With this it launched an offensive against Eritrea.

May 14, 1998— The Eritrean Government presented a
five-point peace plan that tried to commit both countries to condemn the use of
force, demilitarize the disputed territories, settle their border dispute
through bilateral negotiations, if not through mediation and if those don’t work
to refer the case to an international adjudication.

May 30-June 3, 1998— US-Rwanda Peace Plan presented to
Eritrea and Ethiopia. While the US-Rwanda Peace Plan was still on the
table, Ethiopia launched another attack on Eritrea.

June 4-5, 1998— Ethiopia, while announcing acceptance
of the US-Rwanda Peace Plan went ahead and bombed the Eritrean capital, Asmara.

June 14, 1998— Eritrea affirmed its commitment to
abide by the US Brokered Air-Strike moratorium.

June 18, 1998— Ethiopia begun deporting thousands of
Ethiopians of Eritrean origin, some of these were people who lived in Ethiopia
for three generations. By December 1998 Ethiopia was to deport more than 70,000
innocent civilians.

November 7-8, 1998— The OAU presented an
11-point Framework for Agreement and asked both countries to study it and
respond in time before its session in December.

December 12, 1998— Eritrea submitted a set of
questions seeking clarification on the Framework for Agreement.

January 26, 1999— The OAU gave “clarifications” to
Eritrea’s questions.

February 6, 1999— Ethiopia broke the US-brokered air
moratorium and began bombing Eritrean towns and villages and begun an offensive
involving human-wave attacks against Eritrean positions around Badme, the
western sector of the boundary.

February 27, 1999— Eritrea accepted the OAU plan and
the UN Security Council and President Clinton hailed Eritrea's decision.

March 14-16, 1999— Ethiopia rejecting Eritrea’s
acceptance of the OAU Agreement launched another offensive, this time around
Tserona (.

July 14, 1999— The OAU presented Modalities for the
Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement. Eritrea accepted the proposal
immediately and Ethiopia said it has accepted them a week later.

August 5-7, 1999— The OAU presented, on Ethiopia’s
specific request, a non-amendable Technical Arrangements for the Implementation
of the peace plan. Experts from the OAU, the UN, and the US authored the
document. Eritrea announced that it accepted the document in its entirety and
was ready for its full implementation.

August 11, 1999— Ethiopia sought for clarification on
the OAU’s “unamendable” Technical Arrangements and the OAU gave its
clarifications by August 23, 1999.

December 6, 1999— Ethiopia stating it “will not
kneel down to any pressure imposed on the country to accept the technical
arrangements” officially rejected the Technical Arrangements.

February 24- March 4, 2000— The OAU presented
to Eritrea a new proposal in the form of a “non paper”, a document
authored by Ethiopia and meant as a substitute to the Technical Arrangements.

April 27-May 2, 2000— Since Ethiopia had
rejected Eritrea’s proposal of direct talks OAU representatives along
with those from the US government held proximity talks with the two countries in
attempt to broker a consolidated Technical Agreement. As before this attempt was
also frustrated by Ethiopia’s insistence that any agreement should declare the
disputed territories sovereign Ethiopian territories.

May 12, 2000— Failing to get what it wanted
from the negotiating table Ethiopia launched another offensive in attempt
to reverse Eritrea’s independence and if not at least to capture the port of
Assab and overthrow the legitimate Eritrean government by capturing Asmara.

June 18, 2000— After two years of refusal, with
its army soundly defeated along the Assab front and realizing that it cannot
achieve its goal military Ethiopia agreed to and signed the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement. This Agreement established a Temporary Security Zone and
the mandate for The United Nation’s Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) to
monitor it.

December 12, 2000— Eritrea and Ethiopia signed
the Algiers Peace Agreement. The Agreement mandated an Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary
Commission (EEBC) to delimit and demarcate the border “based on pertinent
colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicable international law”
The Commission was not given power to make decisions “ex aequo et bono”
and that its delimitation and demarcation decision will be “final and
binding”. The Agreement also designated the Chief of the Cartographic
Section of the United Nations as the Secretary of the Boundary Commission.

January 26, 2001— Eritrea and Ethiopia submitted to
the Secretary of the Commission their respective claims. At the same time Mr.
Jan Paulson and Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, by Eritrea, and Prince Bola Adesumbo
Ajibola and Sir Arthur Watts by Ethiopia were appointed as Commissioners. These
four in turn selected Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht as President of the
Commission.

March 2, 2001— Ethiopia lodged a challenge to
the appointment by Eritrea of Mr. Jan Paulsson as a Commissioner. The remaining
four members of the Commission didn’t find Ethiopia’s challenge as valid,
nevertheless Mr. Paulsson tendered his resignation as a member of the Boundary
Commission on May 15, 2001.

March 12, 2001— The Secretary of the Commission made
findings identifying those portions of the border as to which there appeared to
be no dispute between the Parties and transmitted his findings to the Parties
and to the Commissioners. The Government of Ethiopia reserved its position with
respect to the findings of the Secretary of the Commission on March 23, 2001.

June 12, 2001— Eritrea appointed Professor W.
Michael Reisman to fill the vacancy created by Mr. Paulson’s resignation and
with this the EEBC was fully formed.

June -December 2001 — Eritrea and Ethiopia filed their
Memorial with the Commission on June 30, 2001. These were followed by Counter
Memorials from both Parties on September 30, 2001 and replies on October 29,
2001. After these written submissions the Commission heard oral arguments
from both parties from December 10 to December 21, 2001.

April 13, 2002— The Eritrea - Ethiopia Boundary
Commission in a 135-page unanimous ruling rendered its final and binding
delimitation Decision. Within hours Ethiopia accepted the ruling declaring it “fair
and appropriate”. It reminded the world that the Decision is
“final and binding with no right to appeal.” and urged Eritrea to “honor
its obligation to cooperate in the demarcation process.”

May 13, 2002— Ethiopia filed with Commission a 35-page
document entitled “Request for Interpretation, Correction and
Consultation”.

June 24, 2002— The Boundary Commission gave its
Decision regarding Ethiopia’s “Request for Interpretation, Correction and
Consultation” and concluded, “the Ethiopian request is inadmissible and no
further action will be taken upon it.”

July 8, 2002— The Commission after consulting both
Parties approved its Demarcation Directions. The Directions specifically
mentioned that “the Commission has no authority to vary the boundary line”
and if in case the boundary line “runs through and divides a town or a
village” the line may be varied only through an “express request agreed
between and made by both parties.”

July 17, 2002— The Commission Field Investigating Team
sent to investigate Eritrea’s allegations that Ethiopia was building new
settlements around Badme west of the April 13, 2002 line presented its report
and based on this the Commission ruled in favor of Eritrea and ordered Ethiopia
to dismantle its new settlements by the end of September 2002.

November 7, 2002— The EEBC gave its
Determinations stating that “the Delimitation Decision of 13 April 2002 is
final and binding in respect of the whole of the boundary between the Parties”
and “Ethiopia, in failing to remove from Eritrean territory persons of
Ethiopian origin who have moved into that territory subsequent to the date of
the Delimitation Decision, has not complied with its obligations.”

January 24, 2003— Ethiopia submitted a 141-page
document indicating that it had only accepted the Commission’s Decision
on the understanding that the “straight-line segment between Points 6 and 9 [Badme
line] would be refined during demarcation” so as to put Badme inside
Ethiopia.

February 21, 2003— In his 8th Report to the UN the
President of the EEBC wrote Ethiopia’s January 23, 2003 Comments

“amounted to an attempt to reopen the substance of the
April Decision”, and “notwithstanding the clarity with which the
Commission has stated the limits upon its authority, Ethiopia has continued
to seek variations to the boundary line delimited in the April Decision, and
has done so in terms that appear, despite protestations to the contrary, to
undermine not only the April Decision but also the peace process as a whole.
...The Commission sees in [comments] an intimation that Ethiopia will not
adhere to the April Decision if its claim to ‘refinement’ of the April
Decision delimitation is not accepted.”

March 6, 2003— UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his
`Progress Report' to the United Nations Security Council, reported that in their
recent meetings with his Special Representative Ethiopian leaders have intimated
that if their “concerns were not properly addressed” they “might
eventually reject the demarcation-related decisions of the Commission.”

March 21, 2003— The EEBC gave its 11-page OBSERVATIONS
on Ethiopia’s 141-page document. The Observations stated that based on the facts
that the Parties had known and agreed in advance that “the Commission’s
delimitation of the boundary might not be identical with previous areas of
territorial administration”, “that it was not open to the Commission to make its
decisions on the basis of ex aequo et bono considerations” and “the boundary as
delimited by the Commission’s Delimitation Decision would be final, i.e., not
subject to amendment” the Commission was is

“obliged to reject the assertion that it must adjust the
coordinates to take into account the human and physical geography in the
border region. Moreover, the Commission firmly rejects the contention that
if such adjustments are not made the Commission’s work would be devoid of
adequate legal basis.”

September 19, 2003— Ethiopia, in a letter of its Prime
Minister to the UN Security Council, officially declared the April Decision as “Null
and Void.” The letter stated the Commission’s Decision is

“totally illegal, unjust, and irresponsible. It is
unimaginable for the Ethiopian people to accept such a blatant miscarriage
of justice. Nothing worthwhile can therefore be expected from the
Commission. The Security Council [should] set up an alternative mechanism to
demarcate the contested parts of the boundary in a just and legal manner.”

October 7, 2003— The EEBC responded to Ethiopia’s
Allegations of September 19, 2003 and concluded that Ethiopia’s letter is “a
repudiation of its repeated acceptance of the Commission’s decision since it was
rendered.”

November 10, 2003— The UN Security Council, in a
letter written to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, stated that “only the full
implementation of the Algiers Agreements will lead to sustainable peace,” “that
Ethiopia has committed itself under the Algiers Agreements to accept the
Boundary Decision as final and binding,” and called “upon the Government
of Ethiopia to provide its full and prompt cooperation to the Boundary
Commission and its field offices in order that demarcation can proceed in all
sectors as directed by the Boundary Commission.”

January 2, 2004—In direct contradiction to the
specifications of the Algiers Agreement and numerous UN Security Council
Resolutions, UN Special Envoy-designate, former Canadian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, in an interview with United Nations Integrated Regional
Information Networks (IRIN), declared the final and binding EEBC Decision as “something
that has to be worked at” and as one that “needs to be developed.”

January 30, 2004— Kofi Annan, appointed Lloyd Axworthy
as his Special Envoy to Eritrea and Ethiopia. Though he still insists that the
appointment doesn’t constitute an ‘alternative mechanism’ Mr. Annan had failed
to date to explicitly state what the mandate of Lloyd Axworthy really is.

November 25, 2004—Ethiopia, as a publicity stunt and
in order to derail the demarcation process, presented its so called “five point
peace plan.” The plan stated that Ethiopia accepts the EEBC Decision “in
principle”, but puts dialogue with Eritrea and adjustment of the April 13, 2002
EEBC delimitation line “on give and take” basis as preconditions for
demarcation.

February 5, 2005—The EEBC called Eritrea and Ethiopia
to a meeting in London to hammer out a new demarcation schedule and continue
with demarcation “without any preconditions.” Eritrea responded positively by
accepting the Commission’s invitation while Ethiopia rejected it, saying the
meeting would be “premature . . . would be unproductive and could have an
adverse impact on the demarcation process. The first priority for success in the
demarcation process is to bring about good faith dialogue between the Parties.”

February 24, 2005—The EEBC, in its 16^{th report to
the Security Council, exposed Ethiopia’s deceptions in these words: “Ethiopia
is not prepared to allow demarcation to continue in the manner laid down in the
Demarcation Directions and in accordance with the timeline set by the
Commission. It now insists on prior ‘dialogue’ but has rejected the opportunity
for such ‘dialogue’ within the framework of the demarcation process provided by
the Commission’s proposal to meet with the Parties on 22 February. This is the
latest in a series of obstructive actions taken since the summer of 2002 and
belies the frequently professed acceptance by Ethiopia of the Delimitation
Decision.” The EEBC concluded its report by stating “the line of the
boundary was legally and finally determined by its Delimitation Decision of 13
April 2002. Though undemarcated, this line is binding upon both Parties. …
Conduct inconsistent with this boundary line is unlawful.”}

March 14, 2005—UN Security Council Resolution 1586
(2005) called on Ethiopia “without preconditions, to start the
implementation of demarcation, by taking the necessary steps to enable the
Commission to demarcate the border completely and promptly.”

May 30, 2005—The EEBC announced that due to Ethiopia’s
refusal to cooperate, it had suspended its all its activities and closed its
field offices.

Feb 01, 2006—Jendayi Frazer, the US Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs, in an interview with the Voice of America
indicated, contrary to the provision of the Algiers agreement, that the
demarcation of the border, should be not on the basis of the final and binding
delimitation Decision of the neutral Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, but
on “adjustments” that she thinks would be “just and reasonable.” In this she
expressly contradicted Article 4.2 of the Algiers agreement which says: “The
parties agree that a neutral Boundary Commission … shall be established with a
mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent
colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicable international law.
The Commission shall not have the power to make decisions ‘ ex aequo et
bono .'”

November 27, 2006—The EEBC announced that it has been
“obliged to adopt another approach to effect the demarcation of the boundary,”
this alternative was the demarcation of the border by coordinates or a “virtual
demarcation” rather than the original plan which was a physical demarcation. It
was compelled to proceed in this manner because of the persistent lack of
cooperation from Ethiopia. The EEBC said that “It is a matter of regret that
Ethiopia has so persistently maintained a position of non-compliance with its
obligations in relation to the Commission. ….
Ethiopia has by its conduct on many occasions repeatedly obstructed the
Commission’s field personnel and prevented them from carrying out the necessary
investigations in the field and made a ‘cooperative process’ impossible.”
The Commission further said that “Modern techniques of image
processing and terrain modeling make it possible, in conjunction with the use of
high resolution aerial photography, to demarcate the course of the boundary by
of turning points (or boundary points) by both grid and geographical coordinates
with a degree of accuracy that does not differ significantly from pillar site
assessment and emplacement undertaken in the field.” A list of the boundary
turning points accompanied by forty-five 1:25,000 scale maps illustrating the
boundary points was given to both parties. Furthermore it gave the parties 12
months to demarcate the border, it warned “if, by the end of that period, the
Parties have not by themselves reached the necessary agreement and proceeded
significantly to implement it, or have not requested and enabled the Commission
to resume its activity, the Commission hereby determines that the boundary will
automatically stand as demarcated by the boundary points listed in the Annex
hereto and that the mandate of the Commission can then be regarded as fulfilled.”

November 27, 2006—The EEBC wrote a lengthy letter in
response to Ethiopia’s complaint. Among the many responses it has the following:

 “One of the elements in Ethiopia’s
complaints is that Eritrea is guilty of the same obstruction. Eritrea’s
non-cooperation with the Commission only really developed after Ethiopia
insisted that the boundary should be altered to meet with what Ethiopia
chose to call ‘anomalies and impracticabilities’, despite the clear
statements of the Commission that this could not be done. When asked to
confirm its continuing acceptance of the Delimitation Decision, Ethiopia
repeatedly qualified its position by saying that it wished negotiations
to take place regarding such ‘anomalies and impracticabilities’.
Eritrea’s insistence on strict adherence to the terms of the
Delimitation Decision was a position which it was entitled to adopt in
accordance with the Algiers Agreement.”

“You place great emphasis on ‘the need for
dialogue and support by neutral bodies to help the two Parties make
progress in demarcation and normalization of their relations’. Of
course, ‘the normalization of relations’ is a desirable objective but
that is a matter that falls outside the scope of the Commission’s
mandate, which is solely to delimit and demarcate the border. The scope
for ‘dialogue’ is limited to what is 
necessary between the Commission and the Parties to further the
actual process of demarcation on the ground. There is no room within the
framework of the Algiers Agreement for the introduction of ‘neutral
bodies’ into the demarcation process.”

 “You ask ‘Why has the Commission abruptly
and without notice chosen to abandon the process for demarcation
embodied in its rules, instructions and decisions? The answer is that
the Commission has been unable to make progress, initially, because of
Ethiopia’s obstruction.”

 “Your letter seeks to blame the
Commission for Ethiopia’s failure to meet its obligations under the
Algiers Agreement. Such blame is entirely misplaced. The truth of the
matter appears to be that Ethiopia is dissatisfied with the substance of
the Commission’s Delimitation Decision and has been seeking, ever since
April 2002, to find ways of changing it. This is not an approach which
the Commission was empowered to adopt and is not one to which the
Commission can lend itself.”

September 6-7, 2007—The EEBC met with both parties, in
this meeting while Eritrea indicated unequivocally its “willingness
to see the process of demarcation resumed”, Ethiopia according to the
Commission once more obstructed demarcation by dwelling on “a series of
observations which did not respond directly to the Agenda, and some of which
related to matters outside the scope of the Commission’s mandate.”

October 2007—John Bolton former US Ambassador to the
UN, in his book “Surrender is not an option” exposed what Jendayi Frazer was
attempting to do a year earlier he wrote: “For reasons I never understood,
however, Frazer reversed course and asked in early February [2006] to reopen the
2002 EEBC decision, which she had concluded was wrong, and award a major piece
of disputed territory to Ethiopia. I was at a loss to explain that to the
Security Council, so I didn't .” p. 347.

November 16, 2007—One of EEBC’s Commissioners, Sir
Arthur Watts, died. Since he was originally appointed by Ethiopia, the EEBC
asked Ethiopia to appoint a substitute and Ethiopia “stated that it does not
consider it necessary to appoint a replacement.”

November 30, 2007—The EEBC disbanded itself and the
boundary automatically stood as demarcated by the boundary points given November
27, 2006. Eritrea accepted the virtual demarcation, Ethiopia rejected it stating
it was “legal nonsense.”

March, 2008—UNMEE started pulling out of Temporary
Security Zone (TSZ) and eventually out of Eritrea. It is to be recalled that
UNMEE’s mandate, according to the Algiers Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities,
ends the minute the EEBC declares the border demarcated. As this was done on
November 30, 2007, UNMEE’s presence in the area after that date was illegal.

July 30, 2008—The UN Security Council officially
disbanded UNMEE.

The Organization of Eritrean Americans (OEA) is a US-based
organization formed to inform people on the truth behind the Eritrea-Ethiopia
and the peace process.